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Theft in the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942
Lee Hargrave*
Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value
which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other
to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the
other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the mis-
appropriation or taking is essential.
Article 67, Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942
There seems to be absolutely no reason why today the
fundamental notion that it is socially wrong to take the property
of another, in any fashion whatsoever, cannot be stated as clearly
and simply as it has been above.
Comment to Article 67
IN GENERAL
One of the major reforms of the Louisiana Criminal Code was to
consolidate the existing stealing offenses into one combined theft pro-
vision. The simple, direct provisions of Article 67 replaced the separate
common law offenses of larceny, embezzlement and obtaining by false
pretenses, and eliminated the technical distinctions between custody and
possession, between obtaining title and possession and between real and
personal property as applied to those crimes.'
The new offense simply required a "taking or misappropriation"
of something. It had to be "something of value," a term of art broadly
defined. It had to be taken "without the consent of the other" or by
"fraudulent conduct, practices or representations." The common law
requirement of an "intent to deprive the other permanently" was re-
tained.
The drafters of Article 67 succeeded in their primary aim of sim-
plifying the law and the courts, in the main, have applied the article
with little difficulty. Two early cases rejected amorphous and vague
constitutional attacks against the criminal code generally and Article 67
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Some 60 statutes were replaced by Article 67. They are listed in the comment
to La. R.S. 14:67.
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particularly. State v. Pete' concluded it was not an adoption of system
of laws by reference prohibited by the state constitution., State v. Smith
4
considered and rejected the argument that Article 67 was unconstitutional
because it purported to denounce two or more separate and distinct
crimes in one provision. It also concluded that prosecution under the
article was not a denial of due process.
Early on, State v. Mills' departed from the common law rule that
real property could not be the subject of larceny. Even though steel
rails were part of a bridge and arguably immovables under Louisiana's
civil law of property, they were nonetheless something of value and
covered by Article 67. The supreme court in State v. Blankenship6 applied
literally the requirement that the thing taken simply belong to another,
saying "in cases of theft proof of ownership of the property stolen in
the particular person alleged is unimportant, the state being required to
show only that it belonged to someone other than the accused."'
Simple and straightforward application of the elements of the new
crime became the standard method of analysis. No doubt, the ease with
which the legal community was able to incorporate and apply the reform
can be traced to the continuing efforts of Dr. Dale Bennett, one of the
three reporters for the code, to teach the new provisions to successive
classes of law students at LSU, and to his regular commentary in the
Louisiana Law Review on the developing cases.8 Also available were the
authoritative drafters' comments to Article 67 to guide the application
of the new provision.9
An important aspect of the 1942 Criminal Code was its clarity and
simplicity. Some would say it is ironic that a document incorporating
the substance of common law crimes displayed a civil law approach to
2. 20 So. 2d 368 (La. 1944).
3. La. Const. art. IlII, § 18 (1921): "The Legislature shall never adopt any system
or code of laws by general reference to such system or code of laws; but in all cases
shall recite at length the several provisions of the laws it may enact."
4. 28 So. 2d 487 (La. 1946).
5. 39 So. 2d 439 (La. 1949).
6. 93 So. 2d 533 (La. 1957).
7. Id. at 535. See also State v. Andrus, 199 So. 2d 867, 875 (La. 1967) ("Ownership
in a particular person is not an element of the crime of cattle theft."), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Blackwell, 298 So. 2d 798 (La. 1973).
8. Upon adoption of the code, he wrote a major article explaining its provisions,
Dale E. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code: A Comparison with Prior Louisiana
Criminal Law, 5 La. L. Rev. 6 (1942). In subsequent years he was the author of the
annual survey of Louisiana criminal law developments in the Louisiana Law Review.
9. The comments continue to be reproduced in most editions of the Louisiana
Criminal Code. Some caution must be exercised in using them today, as changes in the
text of some articles are not reflected in the text of the comments.
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drafting statutes with a high level of generality and simplicity. 0 Indeed,
the first year course in criminal layv at LSU, as developed by Dr. Bennett
and continued by the current crop of teachers," is an excellent intro-
duction to statutory construction and statutory analysis because of the
technical quality of the code.
The elegant 2 simplicity of Article 67 is striking in comparison with
the complex provisions of the Model Penal Code which were adopted
decades later to achieve similar reforms.' The Model Penal Code con-
tains several longer provisions-section 223.1 Consolidation of Theft
Offenses; section 223.2 Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition; section
223.3 Theft by Deception; section 223.4 Theft by Extortion; section
223.5 Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake; section
223.7 Theft of Services; section 223.8 Theft by Failure to Make Required
Disposition of Funds Received. It is true that some of the detail in
these model code provisions might be added to Article 67 with some
benefit. Nonetheless, the theft article was superior in clarity and made
the law understandable for police officers and lay persons as well as
lawyers. It is true that subsequent legislative additions to the theft article
have complicated matters, often unnecessarily so, and have confused the
gradation of penalty policies of the theft law. In most of these instances,
however, the simplest solution would be to return to the original pro-
visions of the 1942 code.
MISAPPROPRIATION OR TAKING
The "taking" element evolved .from larceny's requirement of a cap-
tion or trespassory taking out of the possession of another and some
10. "The Institute was mandated to prepare a codification of the substantive criminal
law. In view of Louisiana's civil law background this could only mean that the projet
was to constitute a true code and not a compilation of separate and independent statutes.
The reporters followed faithfully this direction. Their consistent effort throughout was to
avoid detail as much as the character of the subject would permit and by the choice of
words and form of expression to achieve an internal homogeneity that would tend to
assure uniformity of application." J. Denson Smith, The Louisiana Criminal Code (Its
Background and General Plan), 5 La. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1942).
11. Professors John Baker, Christopher Blakesley, Lee Hargrave, Cheney Joseph, and
Eulis Simien.
12. The phrase is used with appreciation to Julio C. Cueto-Rua, whose appreciation
for "elegance" in drafting was well known among his students at LSU.
13. In a symposium on the 25th anniversary of the Model Penal Code, Sanford
Kadish pointed out the decline of the codification movement in the United States in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-"Except for the singular development of
the enactment of a Louisiana penal code in 1942 ... ." Sanford H. Kadish, The Model
Penal Code's Historical Antecedents, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 521, 537 (1988). Dr. Dale E.
Bennett, reporter for the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942, served on the Criminal Law
Advisory Committee for the Model Penal Code.
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asportation or movement of the thing. 4 The "misappropriation" element
comes from the embezzlement requirement that there be some misuse
of property that was in one's possession.
The Comment to Article 67 suggested that the slightest asportation
or misuse should be sufficient to meet the requirements, and the cases
have followed that suggestion. It was sufficient in State v. Neal that
the defendant held a wallet for a second or two before the victim fired
a shot at him, whereupon he dropped the wallet. The court stated, "A
theft occurs, when the thing is taken, although it may remain in pos-
session of the thief for only seconds."'" Even if the court did apparently
equate the taking requirement with the common law taking and aspor-
tation requirement, "it fortunately continues the common law liberal
construction of that requirement."' 6 It is enough that the thief acquire
some control over the property; "the duration of such control, and the
extent and nature of the movement (asportation) of the article, is im-
material.""'
The pre-code decision of State v. Laborde8 suggested that the thief
himself must carry away the thing to constitute asportation. It was not
larceny if the defendant sold a heifer he did not own to an innocent
third party who carried it away from an open range where it was
located. The case was criticized 9 even under the old law, and was
described as "not persuasive authority" under the new law by Justice
Albert Tate in State v. Victor.20 In Victor, the defendant had his daugh-
ters carry a TV set in a terrarium box to a checkout counter; he was
nonetheless held to be guilty under Article 67.
Victor also addressed directly the problem of applying the taking
or misappropriation requirement to a patron who handles items in a
self service store. The defendant had removed a terrarium from its box
14, Comment La. R.S. 14:67. The Model Penal Code formula in section 223.2 is
similar-"unlawfully takes" or "exercises unlawful control." See Model Penal Code &
Commentaries, § 223.2(l) (1980).
15. 275 So. 2d 765, 770 (La. 1973).
16. Dale E. Bennett, Criminal Law, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1972-73 Term, 34 La. L. Rev. 332, 345 (1974).
17. Id. Accord: State v. Wisham, 476 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (wallet
removed from victim's pocket and was approximately eight inches from his body before
he was able to immediately grab it).
18. 11 So. 2d 404 (La. 1942).
19. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 632 (1972); Dale E.
Bennett, Criminal Law, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1942-1943
Term, 5 La. L. Rev. 512, 556 (1944); Richard A. Michael, Present Problems in Louisiana
Substantive Criminal Law, i1 Loy. L. Rev. 71 (1962); Clarence J. Morrow, The 1942
Louisiana Criminal Code in 1945: A Small Voice From the Past, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 483,
494 (1945); Note, Criminal Law, Asportation as an Essential Element of Larceny, 5 La.
L. Rev. 323 (1943).
20. 368 So. 2d 711, 713 (La. 1979).
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and replaced it with a more expensive television set. The box was placed
on a shopping cart and his two daughters then pushed it to the checkout
counter. At that point, the clerk discovered the television set. Judge
Tate concluded that this conduct met the requirements of Article 67.
He stated "that a theft may occur when there is a 'misappropriation'
(exercise of wrongful dominion) or a 'taking' (unauthorized control)2'
of the property of another, without regard to whether there is physical
movement (asportation) or as to whether the thief has accomplished the
misappropriation or taking by himself personally or through the agency
of others." 22 He further elaborated that this involved exerting control
over the thing "adverse to or usurpatory of the owner's dominion. '
In other words, in a self-service store, one has an expectation "under
usual circumstances" of being able to handle and inspect goods without
disturbing the owner's dominion. But concealing an item in another box
and then directing the daughters to the checkout clerk were beyond
what is permitted. 4 What developed is basically a fictional standard as
to what conduct a reasonable store owner consents to. It can be a
taking without consent if one exerts" control contrary to that fictional
standard. It is a misappropriation of the thing by fraud if one changes
a box or label with the intent to mislead the cashier as to the correct
price.2 5
In any event, the general language of Article 67 was skillfully applied
to the shoplifting situation based on failing to adhere to customary
expectations in self-service stores. This conclusion resulted simply from
application of Article 67. The later addition of Article 67.10 in 1987
(Theft of goods) was unnecessary to obtain convictions in these shop-
lifting situations.26
21. The "unlawful control" language is that used in Model Penal Code § 223.2(1)
(1980).
22. 368 So. 2d at 714.
23. Id.
24. Accord in dictum is Fauria v. Doe, 483 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985)
(store did not consent to customer spraying some of the contents of a Static Guard aerosol
can on her pants).
25. Accord as to the taking or misappropriation issue: State v. Nguyen, 584 So. 2d.
256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). The case is questionable in its analysis of something of
value. The defendant intended to take clothing by fraudulent representations as to the
price, by paying part of that price. What was taken was not "value"; it was corporeal
items that were to be taken. But since part of the price was to be paid, the amount of
the taking should be the difference in the retail price and the amount to be paid.
Punishment should be based on that amount.
26. La. R.S. 14:67.10 was added by 1987 La. Acts No. 914 after Victor was decided.
The main thrust of the new article, however, was not to elaborate on the taking or
misappropriation requirement. Instead, it concentrated on the mental element, stating an
intent to deprive "may be inferred when a person: (1) Intentionally conceals, on his
1113
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Determining whether a fictionalized consent or lack of consent existed
was a problem in State v. Byars.27 Although the rules for use of a
telephone credit card number issued to the mayor of a city did not
appear to be written or definite, a conviction of the mayor's son for
theft by using the card was affirmed. The mayor gave the card to his
son when the latter left on tour with a Christian singing group, instructing
him to use it only in case of emergency. The simplest approach to the
case, which the court of appeal ultimately used, was to conclude that
the son exceeded the scope of his father's permission when he used the
card frequently for non-emergency calls after his return. However, the
opinion also refers to the argument made by the State that the use was
without the city's consent. In response, the court pointed to a secretary's
testimony that she and others had made personal calls in the past using
the city's card, even if the practice was not encouraged, and that the
employees reimbursed the city for the calls. The intimation is that such
a regular, tolerated practice could establish a fictionalized consent to
such conduct.
In a domestic relations context, a court of appeal divided 2-1 over
whether the defendant/girlfriend exceeded the scope of her lover's con-
sent to deal with blank checks he signed and left with her while he
was away at work for a week or two. The bank account was his alone,
but his practice when he left was to leave one or two signed checks to
cover living expenses for her and his son who lived with them. After
their relationship ended, he complained to the police, and the State
argued based on his testimony, that she made some checks out to herself
and for more than the receipts she kept for items purchased. The court
of appeal noted he gave her no explicit instructions not to make the
checks to herself or for more than the purchase amount on the receipts
and reversed the conviction.28
person or otherwise, goods held for sale; (2) Alters or transfers any price marking reflecting
the actual retail price of the goods; (3) Transfers goods from one container or package
to another or places goods in any container, package, or wrapping in a manner to avoid
detection; (4) Willfully causes the cash register or other sales recording device to reflect
less than the actual retail price of the goods; or (5) Removes any price marking with the
intent to deceive the merchant as to the actual retail price of the goods."
27. 550 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
28. State v. Fuqua, 558 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990). Judge Domengeaux
dissented, concluding the evidence supported a determination that "defendant's conduct
was fraudulent and was a violation of the trust which was placed in her by her paramour."
Note that with respect to community property not subject to the requirements of con-
currence of both spouses to alienate, one spouse acting alone has the right to alienate
the property without the consent of the other. Such a right would appear to be a
justification for a defendant spouse if it is urged that such an alienation was without the
consent of the other spouse. On the other hand, if the misappropriation by a spouse is
by a fraudulent act of a spouse, it could meet the theft requirement. See Katherine S.
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Fraudulent conduct was found in State v. Volentine,29 when a de-
fendant induced an elderly couple to write 142 checks for a total of
more than $100,000 over a three year period by statements of
assorted reasons for needing more money, including medical
treatment for terminal cancer, of which defendant once said she
had only six months to live without surgery. On different oc-
casions, defendant would request and receive a replacement of
a previously executed check, said to have been destroyed or lost,
although later both instruments would be found to have been
negotiated by her. She also misrepresented that certain checks
had been drawn against insufficient funds, and ... that, without
a second instrument, they both would "go to jail."30
Absent a specific provision covering lost property or property re-
ceived by mistake, the courts have construed the taking or misappro-
priation element of theft to cover such situations. It has not been a
tidy solution, as State v. Langford"' demonstrates. Because of a mistake
by a clerk, defendant's new bank account was computer coded to allow
payment of unlimited amounts of overdrafts. This occurred soon after
defendant was denied a loan for $225,000. Once defendant learned his
overdrafts were being honored, he continued to issue more checks, at
an almost logarithmic increase, until the total amount overdrawn was
$848,000. Despite the bank's error and the negligence of its officers in
throwing away the unread computer printouts that indicated the in-
creasing overdrafts, the court of appeal concluded, "The bank was a
victim of its own mistakes .... The bank's intention was to allow no
overdrafts .... That the bank consented to the defendant's taking
$848,000 as some sort of loan is not a reasonable hypothesis when its
refusal to loan defendant $225,000 one week before the account was
opened is considered." 3 The supreme court agreed, stating that the
evidence "supports the fact that no human person with the bank ever
made a conscious decision to honor defendant's checks .... -33 That
approach obviously involves a fiction and a questionable analysis of
how a corporation expresses consent to anything.34
Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, § 11.2 at 435 in 16 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise Series (1989); Carl F. Walker, Comment, Theft Between Spouses in Louisiana,
15 La. L. Rev. 736 (1955).
29. 565 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
30. Id. at 514.
31. 483 So. 2d 979 (La. 1986).
32. State v. Langford, 467 So. 2d 41, 43 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
33. 483 So. 2d at 984.
34. Chief Justice Dixon and Justice Watson dissented. Dixon explained, "The state
argues that only the manager could consent to an overdraft. I do not think it is incumbent
1115
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More to the point, however, the supreme court also states its decision
is equally supported by the fact that "the defendant had to have known
a mistake was being made." 3 Then it cites LaFave and Scott's com-
mentary describing the common law larceny rule as applied to obligations
to return property delivered by mistake. 6 Perhaps straightforward adop-
tion of the common law rule would be the better approach to cover
this possible hiatus in Article 67. Otherwise, the court's first rationale
would make thieves of all persons who write overdrafts if the bank
mistakenly pays them. Section 223.5 of the Model Penal Code has the
benefit of more precision in this regard and its language might be
incorporated into Article 67. It provides: "A person who comes into
control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid,
or delivered under a mistake . .. is guilty of theft if, with purpose to
deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore
the property to a person entitled to have it." '1
THE MENTAL ELEMENT
Article 67 continued the common law mental element, stating simply
that "lain intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be
the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential." The drafters'
comments refer to it as a "special mental element," supporting the
subsequent cases holding that it is a specific criminal intent requirement
rather than general intent." Theft is thus subject to a defense of vol-
untary intoxication-in the unlikely event that a defendant was so in-
toxicated as to be unable to form that intent. 39
on the defendant in a case such as this to trace consent through an elusive and ill-defined
chain of command to the ultimate figure in authority. The record does not disclose
precisely how many Hibernia personnel had a hand in procuring and adapting the system
or in maintaining Langford's account. A committee of bank officials selected a computer
program with a code for unlimited overdrafts, supervised its installation and oversaw its
operation. One service representative opened Langford's account, a second processed it
as an "01" account and a third reviewed the processing the following day. The entire
bookkeeping department, trained to handle overdrafts on such accounts, and knowing it
was doing so, permitted Langford to draw checks against his. Those who testified either
denied knowledge of what they did or their authority to do it. A designation of yet
another employee whose participation or advice should have been solicited should not in
this instance be found to vitiate the bank's consent." 483 So. 2d at 986.
35. 483 So. 2d at 984.
36. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 85 (1972).
37. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.5 (1980).
38. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:11 explains that specific intent requires the subjective
desire to produce stated consequences while general intent is a more objective standard.
See State v. White, 404 So. 2d 1202 (La. 1981); State v. Crosby, 515 So. 2d 570 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1987); State v. Thibodeaux, 441 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Andre
Doguet, Comment, The Louisiana Criminal Code and Criminal Intent: Distinguishing
Between Specific and General Intent, 46 La. L. Rev. 1061 (1986).
39. See State v. Rogers, 464 So. 2d 955 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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A strict application of the "permanent" requirement has expectedly
not taken place. The courts have continued the common law's loose
construction of that element.40 In State v. Langford,4 the court affirmed
the conviction even though the defendant may have had the intent to
repay the entire amount of his overdrafts at some point. Even so, the
court stated, "a defendant must show both that he had the intent to
return the property within a reasonable time, and that he had a sub-
stantial ability to do So.''42 Applying the same standard, the supreme
court reversed a conviction for theft in State v. McBride.43 The defendant
took jewelry worth more than $1000 from his sister and pawned it to
borrow $100. He gave the pawn ticket to his mother, along with an
explanation of what he did. The court concluded that he had the ability
to repay the loan and redeem the jewelry. "Under these circumstances,
we conclude that any reasonable trier of fact would have a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended to permanently deprive his sis-
ter. . ."
If this approach is to continue, it might be helpful to adopt the
rule as a statute using the Model Penal Code's updated language. Section
223.0 includes in the definition of deprive: "(a) to withhold property
of another permanently for so extended a period as to appropriate a
major portion of its economic value, or with intent to restore only upon
payment of reward or other compensation; or (b) to dispose of the
property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it."
A literal analysis might suggest that the first sentence of Article 67
does not include a mental element. It. states, "Theft is the misappro-
priation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either
without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or
by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations." In a
literal approach, it would be sufficient if the taking is without the
consent of the other and if it is something of value belonging to another
that is taken. One could be guilty even if one believed the owner
consented or that it was one's own property that was being taken. The
scope of the mistake of fact defense provided in Article 16, however,
suggests that such a literal reading is improper. Comments to Article
16 give as illustrations of the mistake of fact defense the misappropriation
of another's property under the reasonable belief it belonged to the
offender or receiving stolen goods reasonably believed not to be stolen.
This view is also supported by the language of the second sentence of
40. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.2 commentary at 174 (1980).
41. 483 So. 2d 979 (La. 1986).
42. Id. at 985, citing Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 88
(1972).
43. 504 So. 2d 840 (La. 1987).
44. Id. at 842.
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Article 67. It would not be an intent to deprive another if one thought
the thing was one's own property; it would not be an intent to deprive
if one thought one had permission.45
The cases have routinely construed the mental element to allow a
defense if one thought the other consented to the takings.1 More difficult
are the cases in which disputes over the extent of one's consent arises.
Often these matters are contractual disputes, and the tendency in the
cases is to apply a strict construction of the criminal law requirements.
In State v. Thibodeaux,"7 the defendant/lessee of a house and its owners
apparently agreed that the defendant would repair the house in exchange
for the furniture in it. It was disputed whether the agreement was also
contingent on the defendant agreeing to purchase the house. Three
months later, the defendant, now delinquent in paying rent, moved out
with the furniture and without notifying the owners. The defendant did
not conceal himself and left a forwarding address. The court of appeal
reversed a theft conviction, stating, "In this case, the evidence simply
does not reasonably support the inference of mens rea or criminal intent.
It is this state of mind that normally distinguishes criminal acts (pun-
ishable by the State alone) from mere civil wrongs (actionable by private
individuals against one another).' '4
Similarly, in State v. Saucier,'49 the court of appeal reversed a con-
viction for attempted theft arising out of failure to pay for a dog. The
owner initially allowed defendant to take custody of his male dog to
mate with her bitch, with the understanding he would take one of the
puppies. The mating was unsuccessful, and, according to the owner,
she then agreed to purchase the dog for $100, which she did not pay.
The court pointed out that there was no proof that at the time of the
45. Most common synonyms for deprive have a pejorative connotation, which would
not be an apt expression to use in the case of one who consented to the taking. WordPerfect
5.1's synonyms include: despoil, rob, seize, strip, deny, refuse, withhold. Accord as to
the claim of right defense is Section 223.1(3) of the Model Penal Code, which makes it
a defense if the actor "(a) was unaware that the property or service was that of another;
or (b) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved or that
he had a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did; or (c) took property exposed for
sale, intending to purchase and pay for it promptly, or reasonably believing that the
owner, if present, would have consented." See Model Penal Code & Commentaries, §
223.1 and commentary at 151, also § 223.2 commentary at 171, 178 (1980).
46. State v. Webb, 372 So. 2d 1209 (La. 1979) (error to exclude evidence that defendant
was told by others that the building was to be demolished and that the owner did not
object to anyone taking whatever he wanted); State v. Kinney, 431 So. 2d 16 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1983) (defendant thought he was taking fish from a friend's net and that his
friend would not mind). Contrast State v. Sloan, 426 So. 2d 368 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983)
(unreasonable to believe used parts stacked outside a repair shop were abandoned).
47. 441 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 823.
49. 485 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
1118 [Vol. 52
19921 THEFT IN THE LA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1942
taking, which was consented to, she had a specific intent to deprive the
owner. Although "her failure to return the dog or pay cash for the
animal might give rise to a civil action by the McLoughlins for breach
of contract, the facts do not support a criminal conviction for theft or
attempted theft of the animal.""0
Such cases of failure to pay the price for items sold are on the
borderline of the criminal law. Under traditional larceny principles, the
taking must occur at the same moment the defendant has the intent
not to pay for the item. If the intent not to pay is formed later, it is
not larceny. Actual failure to pay becomes a fact from which some
inferences might be made as to the mental state of the defendant at
the time of transfer of the item. Failure to pay of itself is not enough.
If it were, the criminal law would be close to imprisoning persons for
nonpayment of debts, a throwback to Medieval times. A modern listing
of the reasons for not criminalizing non-payment of debts comes from
the commentaries to the Model Penal Code:
Among the valid objections to the employment of criminal
sanctions to enforce debts, as distinct from protecting "own-
ership" of "property," may be included the following: (i) the
legitimacy of contract breach in contexts where it becomes ad-
vantageous to the breaching party to pay damages rather than
to fulfill his agreement; (ii) the propriety of withholding funds
that may be burdened by contractual obligation, an action which
is often recognized as an effective self-help remedy to force the
obligee to negotiate or initiate litigation; (iii) a feeling that it
is up to the contract maker to select his risks and that the
invocation of criminal sanctions in cases of non-performance
involves the impairment of the incentive to make wise risk
selections and thus impairment of the social functions of con-
tract-making, as well as possibilities of abuse; (iv) the impropriety
of using the moral stigma of the criminal law to enforce contracts
in situations where non-performance is regarded as a morally
neutral act; (v) the unlikelihood of deterring honest insolvency
by criminal threats, since insolvency is so often a result of factors
beyond the control of the individual; (vi) the dangers, in at-
tempting to punish insolvency for which the actor may properly
be viewed as at fault, of discouraging the kind of speculation
that is properly a part of a free-enterprise system and of securing
unjust convictions by hindsight; and (vii) the futility, from the
creditors' standpoint, of imprisoning a debtor who is unable to
pay.5
50. Id. at 585.
51. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.8 commentary at 258 (1980). See also
§ 223.1 commentary at 131.
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The traditional approach reflecting these policy concerns seems to
continue in the supreme court's constructions of Article 67, with a strict
construction approach that tends to avoid injustice. The court reversed
a conviction in State v. Hoffer. " Although defendant may have mis-
represented himself at an automobile auction as a licensed and bonded
dealer, the State failed to prove an intent to deprive. The defendant
had paid for fourteen vehicles with fourteen drafts, three of which were
honored and eleven of which were not. Chief Justice Dixon wrote:
The defendant also challenges the trial judge's reliance on
the fact that the drafts were never paid as indicating an intention,
at the time they were signed, not to honor them. To allow such
a conclusion, argues the defendant, would subject every de-
faulting debtor to criminal charges. While non-payment is con-
sistent with the intention not to pay, and, of course, a prerequisite
to bringing criminal charges, it is not sufficiently indicative of
intention not to pay to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt the
intention to pay. There was also evidence presented that three
of the fourteen drafts were paid, and that the defendant and
Mr. Musselwhite had agreed that the drafts were to be paid by
Musselwhite, as he was the owner of the lot and would receive
the purchase price of the cars from their eventual retail buyers.
This is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that was not ex-
cluded by the evidence."
ANYTHING OF VALUE
Article 2(2) of the Criminal Code of 1942 (Definitions) provided
that "anything of value"
must be given the broadest possible construction, including any
conceivable thing of the slightest value, movable or immovable,
corporeal or incorporeal, public or private. It must be construed
in the broad popular sense of the phrase, not necessarily as
synonymous with the traditional legal term "property.' 4
Explaining these terms, the drafters stated "it is extremely important
that they be taken to include as much as possible. They have been used
52. 420 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1982). Accord: State v. Robinson, 463 So. 2d 663 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985) (defendant falsely said he was an attorney when he took $500 to
have a relative transferred from prison to a work release program; if he made any effort
to obtain the transfer, his actions would not be theft).
53. 420 So. 2d at 1093.
54. The last sentence of the definition was added by amendment in 1977. It was
directed to determining amount taken rather than whether a thing was a thing of value
or not. It states, "in all cases involving shoplifting the term 'value' is the actual retail
price of the property at the time of the offense."
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in place of long enumerations in many articles, and only by an extensive
interpretation will their purpose be served.""
The definition was complicated by the addition in 1962 of the phrase,
"and including transportation, telephone and telegraph services, or any
other service available for hire.' '56
The initial broad approach, plus the specific examples, solved most
of the problems of applying the article to immovable property,5" to
incorporeal rights, and to obtaining services without payment. The courts,
however, have not been able to develop a consistent rationale to establish
limits to what may be the object of theft. Indeed, the code itself poses
some structural problems in apparently defining the concept to be any-
thing, and indicating the "broadest possible construction" of those terms
is to be used.
Use of an automobile, for example, could be included in the def-
inition of anything of value. But the existence of Article 68, Unauthorized
Use of Movables, which applies when one has no intent to deprive the
owner of the vehicle and its different penalty structure, suggests that it
would be inconsistent with the gradation of punishment policies to allow
a conviction for the more serious crime of theft for such conduct. This
conclusion is also supported by the language added in 1962 which refers
to any service available for hire. Rental car services would seem to be
included in theft, so that if one takes a rental car with the intent to
return it, theft occurs, with the penalty based on the amount not paid,
that sum being the value of the service. At the same time, the added
language has the negative connotation that a similar service that is not
available for hire-using a car that is not available for rental-would
not be included in the definition of anything of value.
Indeed, a regular part of any law school criminal law class involves
the possibility of extending the notion of anything of value to any use
of things that lessen the useful life of the object. It might also extend
to a competitive advantage being gained by cheating on an admissions
test or obtaining forcible sex from another. Drawing the line and stating
the rationale for such a line has been a problem for the courts.
State v. Picoul0 affirmed the quashing of an indictment for theft.
The State alleged the defendant/attorney misled a client into hiring him
to prosecute a personal injury claim for a contingent fee. He recorded
55. Comment to La. R.S. 14:2(2).
56. 1962 La. Acts No. 68. The added language was probably not necessary but the
amendment "removes all doubt." Dale E. Bennett, Criminal Law and Procedure, Louisiana
Legislation of 1962: A Symposium, 23 La. L. Rev. 64, 65 (1962). The Model Penal Code,
rather than including services in its definition of property, established a separate offense
of theft of services. See Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.7 (1980).
57. State v. Mills, 39 So. 2d 439 (La. 1949) (rails incorporated into a railroad bridge).
58. 107 So. 2d 691 (La. 1959).
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the contingent fee contract two weeks later, invoking the statute which
provided that upon such recordation, third persons could not settle the
suit without the attorney's consent. The State's theory was that a portion
.of a cause of action was taken, and that cause of action was something
of value. Obviously, the incorporeal right to sue met the literal definition
of Article 2, and it is well known that such incorporeals are transferable
and bring in substantial sums depending on the facts of the case. 9 But
the court did not inquire into those facts, which were not available on
the appeal of the motion to quash. It simply stated that the defendant
did not take anything of value.
Justice Hamiter suggested that the case involved "nothing more"
than an employment agreement, and that the transfer of a part of the
cause of action was a device to protect the attorney's fee. But he does
admit that if the attorney won, he would be paid. Presumably that
would be something-a contingent right-that meets the definition of
Article 2. He also refers to the contingent aspect of the contract, saying
it had only "potential value" and no "real value." But potential value
would seem to come within the definition's reference to the "slightest"
value. He adds that what the attorney acquired was something that was
not salable and transferrable by him. But again, Article 2 does not seem
to exclude items of value because they cannot be sold or transferred.
Justice Hamiter also reasoned that even if there was a taking of some-
thing of value, the intent to deprive permanently did not exist at that
time; only upon recordation of the contract was the intent developed.
That analysis may be more sound, but it would still seem to require a
factual determination of the defendant's mental state, which would have
to occur at trial, and not on a preliminary motion to quash. The opinion
of the four-judge majority is weakened by Justice Simon's dissent in
which he stated his opinion that the cause of action was a thing of
value. Justices McCaleb and Fournet concurred, stating they believed a
cause of action was a thing of value, but that defendant's conduct did
not meet the taking requirement. They took that view since the transfer
was founded on valid consideration-promise of legal services. -They
stated any fraud would give rise only to a civil action for annulment.
A critical law review analysis of Picou6° suggested a plausible jus-
tification for the result-the existence of a specialized procedure for
disciplining attorneys for improper solicitation of clients. One could
perhaps fashion a legislative intent policy argument that allowing theft
59. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977) (attorney contingent fee contracts a
community asset subject to partition at termination).
60. J.C. Parkerson, Note, Criminal Law, Theft-A Cause of Action Not a Thing
of Value, 19 La. L. Rev. 872 (1959). Also critical of Picou is Richard A. Michael. Present
Problems in Louisiana Substantive Criminal Law, II Loy. L. Rev. 71, 88 (1962).
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prosecutions in such matters would be inconsistent with the minor pen-
alties associated with control of solicitation and that the narrowed con-
struction of anything of value responds to that concern.
Another possible justification of the decision might be the notion
that, given the larceny roots of Article 67, the thing of value must pre-
exist the defendant's conduct. If the fraud occurs in the creation of the
thing, albeit an incorporeal thing, there is no taking of something already
existing.
Eight years later, the supreme court affirmed a conviction using a
contrary analysis in State v. Fruge.6 1 The opinion was written by Chief
Justice Fournet, who had concurred in Picou. Again, the defendant was
a prominent politician, a high ranking state senator. He was convicted
of theft for aiding a full-time state employee in getting a second job
as secretary of the committee of which he was chairman. Under senate
rules, he was entitled to hire a secretary and to prescribe her duties.
To avoid the state's prohibition against dual office holding, she gave
her sister's name and social security number. The conviction was affirmed
in a weak opinion that relied in large part on Criminal Code articles
137-139 defining the crime of Dual Office Holding. Indeed, the defense
had used the gradation of penalty argument-that the existence in the
same code of a specific crime with a smaller penalty was an indication
of legislative purpose not to consider such conduct as theft. Chief Justice
Fournet wrote:
This argument would seem to logically follow, but it is clear
the theft article in its broad and all embracive language includes
the conduct forming the basis of the charge in this case; hence,
the district attorney, under the express provisions of the Criminal
Code had the discretion of proceeding under either the general
article or the special article.6
Under the majority's approach, it is not clear exactly what the thing
of value was-the money received? Or the job? Presumably, the Picou
majority would have found that it was employment that she obtained,
which it held in the prior case was not something of value. Also, in
Fruge as in Picou, consideration was received by the state-secretarial
services.
Other than the inconsistency with Picou, the Fruge result could be
justified as a simple application of the textual requirements. The thing
obtained was money; it was obtained by fraudulent representations and
there was the intent to keep the funds. That the work required was
performed would be irrelevant since the state was misled into hiring the
61. 204 So. 2d 287 (La. 1967).
62. Id. at 291-92.
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worker. But would the court be willing to say, for example, that a
plumber who lies and says he is a Christian in order to do work for
a customer who employs only Christians be guilty of theft if he received
money in return for the work? 63 Perhaps, more realistically, there was
a tinge of possible corruption in that the legislative oversight provisions
were so weak that the secretary could have received pay and done no
work.
Later decisions did not follow the change of approach that might
have been signaled by Fruge. State v. McIntyre," decided five years
later, is the oft-cited decision which suggests that viewing an LSU football
game is not something of value. Of course, a literal application of
Article 2 would apply to this service available for hire, so that one who
sneaked into the stadium or who forged a ticket would be guilty of
theft. In McIntyre, however, the defendant was a non-student who tried
to use a student's identification card to obtain admission to the game.
At that time, students did not have to purchase individual game tickets,
but were admitted into a student section upon showing an ID card.
Defendant was apprehended before entry and accused of attempted theft.
Since another person, a student, would have been entitled to admission
using the card, the court reasoned that the university lost nothing. But,
as Dr. Dale Bennett commented at the time, that analysis "loses sight
of the true nature of attempts .... The attempt is punishable even
though the defendant failed to accomplish his criminal purpose and no
harm was actually suffered by the intended victim." '65 And in fact, if
he had achieved his purpose, the university would have been deprived
of the difference in price charged non-students and students to attend
the football games.
The court also suggested that such a matter was one which "addresses
itself to the internal discipline of Louisiana State University. . . ."6 That
approach may be more fruitful, in light of the suggestion that Picou
could be explained by the inferences of legislative intent coming from
bar discipline powers. In the same way, the university's power to dis-
cipline students would be a reflection of a gradation policy of lesser
non-criminal punishment in such situations. But in McIntyre, the de-
fendant was not a student and not subject to the university's disciplinary
powers; only the student who loaned his card could be punished by
LSU. Dr. Bennett concluded, "In essence the court was not ready to
63. Note that the Model Penal Code, in Section 223.3 (theft by deception), states
that the term deceive does not include "falsity as to matters having no pecuniary sig-
nificance." Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.3 (1980).
64. 269 So. 2d 448 (La. 1972).
65. Dale E. Bennett, Criminal Law, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1972-73 Term, 34 La. L. Rev. 332, 344 (1974).
66. 269 So. 2d at 449.
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treat defendant's conduct as 'fraudulent,' within the meaning of the
Louisiana theft article. A very close case, which might well have been
decided the other way, was presented." 67 Under this view, then, McIntyre
does not represent so much a case explaining the anything of value
requirement, but one making a narrow construction of the fraud re-
quirement.
Narrow construction remained the norm in the 1980's when thi
court decided State v. Gisclair." Again, a public official was involved,
a parish assessor whose employees worked on his private camp during
regular working hours. The only pay they received was their salaries
from the state, but the employees testified they voluntarily performed
the tasks and also worked an equivalent time after hours in the assessor's
office so that the state lost no services. Essentially, the odd factual
record would indicate that the assessor was shifting the time of the
work for the state from regular hours to other times.
The lower court had found the assessor guilty of Unauthorized Use
of Movables as a responsive verdict under an. accusation of theft. The
supreme court's analysis of guilt of this lesser included offense under
a responsive verdict to a theft charge is thus convoluted in that it
discusses whether defendant would be guilty of theft. On that issue, the
lower court had found no deprivation of services to the state and no
intent to deprive. But Chief Justice Dixon went further. Though he
admitted that services are within the definition of something of value,
he also indicated, "The indictment charges that the services belonged
to the parish and the state. The parish and the state cannot own the
services of their employees."6 9 He also suggested that if anyone owns
the services, it is the employees themselves and "there is no charge that
the services were stolen from the employees." 70 But if that is so, then
never can a customer who refuses to pay for the work by an employee
of a service station be found guilty if the employee consents, even
though the owner suffers an economic detriment. To support his con-
clusion, Justice Dixon cites the proposition that use of services did not
constitute larceny.' But that begs the question, which is whether the
67. Bennett, supra note 65, at 344.
68. 382 So. 2d 914 (La. 1980).
69. Id. at 916.
70. Id.
71. Justice Dixon relies on Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law,
§ 87, at 634 (1972). The court also cites Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d 274 (9th
Cir. 1959) which held that an air force sergeant who had an airman paint his private
property during working hours was not guilty of theft. The court concluded that services
were not a subject of theft under a federal statute. That decision was criticized in Comment,
Theft of Labor and Services, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 663 (1960). The Model Penal Code Section
223.7 was adopted to depart from cases like Chappell. See Model Penal Code & Com-
mentaries; § 223.7 and commentary at 250 n.1 (1980).
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change from the elements in larceny was the adoption of a statute that
would include services. The definition in Article 2 would certainly indicate
as much, so long as they are services available for hire.
It is of course possible to consider the discussion in Gisclair as
dictum, since the conviction was not for theft, but for unauthorized
use of a movable as a responsive verdict for theft. Article 68, the
hnauthorized use of a movable, does not refer to anything of value,
but to "taking or use of a movable which belongs to another." In that
regard, Justice Dixon stated, "It is clear that the choice of the term
'movables' in the statute was due to the lack of another term to describe
the tangible objects covered under prior laws. The services of employees
are not tangible objects and cannot be the object of a charge of unau-
thorized use of movables under R.S. 14:68."1 Supporting this approach
is the fact that the listing of statutes that Article 68 was designed to
consolidate refers only to corporeal things, even though the term movable
as used in the civil code includes incorporeal rights."
In a civil case, the fourth circuit court of appeal, by a 3-2 decision,
was expansive in its construction. Fauria v. Doe74 was an action by an
alleged shoplifter for damages because she suffered a miscarriage after
being improperly detained by supermarket security officers. Plaintiff had
taken a can of Static Guard75 from the shelf, sprayed some on her
pants, then placed the can in her shopping cart. Later, she decided she
did not want the product and replaced it on the shelf. The court
concluded that the small amount of product sprayed was sufficient to
justify her arrest. On the other hand, simply using another's soap in a
washroom without consent would not seem to be enough to be theft.76
Most recently, State v. Berry" also produced a narrow construction
of the anything of value requirement. There, defendant was convicted
of attempted theft for inducing an allegedly incompetent Alzheimer's
disease victim to execute a notarial act of adoption of the major de-
fendant. The State's theory was that she thus intended to become the
victim's heir who would inherit all her property. Defendant argued that
theft of a hope to inherit does not constitute a thing of value.
The court recognized the weakness in the Picou analysis, but stated,
"we nevertheless find it to be good precedent." 78 Apparently thinking
in terms of a taking from the heirs, the court said, "we conclude that
there was only a potential value as to the heirs."' 9 On the other hand,
72. 382 So. 2d at 916.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 473.
74. 483 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
75. A fabric conditioner and anti-static electricity product sold in aerosol cans.
76. State v. Marcello, 385 So. 2d 244 (La. 1980).
77. 545 So. 2d 1151 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
78. Id. at 1154.
79. Id.
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it would seem that what defendant wanted was clearly something val-
uable-the movable and immovablew° property of the aged victim. Per-
haps one could technically conclude that these things would not belong
to another at the time of the taking-when she died. But then they
would, at least fictitiously, be the property of the legal heirs, and then
they belonged to another in a broad sense. More realistically, perhaps
the case can be explained in terms of there not being an act tending
directly toward the accomplishment of her purpose. Two weeks after
the adoption, the victim was interdicted by other persons and a civil
action was filed to rescind the adoption. Defendant then agreed to a
consent judgment rescinding the adoption. In that case, she was quite
far from success and would not be guilty under traditional attempt
principles.
In any event, this construction of anything of value does not present
the neatest of packages. Perhaps the best that can be said is that given
the possible due process problems of vagueness in these cases at the
edge, the courts use strict construction and find some guidance from
the policies of other statutes in and out of the criminal code.
Another legislative alternative to improve the situation seems difficult
to find. The Model Penal Code's definition would not be much more
precise in the vague areas. It states that property means "anything of
value" and then gives a listing, "including real estate, tangible and
intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other
interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets,
captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power.'",
The perils of a long list of examples, however, are ever present, and
the enumeration can be seen as a limitation of the generic definition.
For example, the attempts in Massachusetts to expand coverage by a
long listing failed to consider the development of video tape. The court
in Commonwealth v. YourawskPl held that property did not include
making an authorized videocassette copy of the movie Star Wars.
WHicH BELONGS TO ANOTHER
Article 67 does not require the State to prove who owns the property
taken, only that the thing belonged to another-someone who is not
the defendant.8 3
80. Under the Model Penal Code, immovable property can be the object of theft
only if one "unlawfully transfers immovable property of another or any interest therein
with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto." There was no transfer
under the facts of Berry. See Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.2(1) and com-
mentary at 172 (1980).
81. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.0(6) (1980).
82. 425 N.E.2d 298 (Mass. 1981).
83. State v. McClanahan, 262 So. 2d 499 (La. 1972).
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As stated earlier, it seems simple to conclude that one is not guilty
of theft if one takes what one reasonably believes is one's own property.
If one takes one's property from another who has some right of pos-
session of it, one should meet the requirements of theft since this right
of possession is something of value. The intangible right itself is what
is taken under this analysis, and one avoids the common law fictions
that were used to make such takings larceny of the object itself.8 4 Under
Article 67, the penalty should be based on the value of the right of
possession rather than on the value of the object.
Article 2(1) defines "another" to include any other legal person or
legal entity. Since Louisiana partnership law has been construed as giving
the partnership a legal personality, it follows that a partner can be
guilty of theft from the partnership in which he has an interest. State
v. Morales, 5 so held, overruling State v. Peterson."
Husbands and wives in Louisiana, given the state's civil law roots,
were never merged into one personality as they were under the common
law."7 It should easily follow that spouses can be guilty of taking the
property of another if they steal from each other. That seems clear as
to separate property.88 If the items involved are community property,
they are co-owned in indivision by the spouses under a special man-
agement scheme. Under that scheme, each spouse has a right to alienate
community movables without the consent of the other." Thus, the
conduct should not constitute theft; it is a permitted taking which is
justified by law.9 That authorization, however, does not include the
alienation if it is done fraudulently or with bad faith; such action would
give the spouse an action in damages. 9' The crucial question then becomes
the mental state of the defendant-he should be guilty of theft if he
84. State v. Cohen, 263 N.W. 922 (Minn. 1935).
85. 240 So. 2d 714 (La. 1970). The Model Penal Code rule is the same. The same
rule also applies to owners in indivision of property. Model Penal Code & Commentaries,
§ 223.2 commentary at 169 (1980).
86. 95 So. 2d 608 (La. 1957).
87. The Model Penal Code abandoned the common law rule, providing that it is no
defense for theft that it was taken from a spouse, "except that misappropriation of
household and personal effects or other property normally accessible to both spouses, is
theft only if it occurs after the parties have ceased living together." Model Penal Code
& Commentaries, § 223.1(4) (1980).
88. Carl F. Walker, Comment, Theft Between Spouses in Louisiana, 15 La. L. Rev.
736 (1955).
89. La. Civ. Code art. 2346.
90. La. R.S. 14:18(3) (offender's conduct justified "[wlhen for any reason the of-
fender's conduct is authorized by law"). In McVay v. McVay, 318 So. 2d 660 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1975), a civil action for conversion, the court reasoned that the ex-husband was
liable because he improperly took and hid a former community automobile that the wife
was using.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 2354.
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acts fraudulently with the specific intent to deprive the other spouse of
that property.
Indeed, the legislation itself provides the instances in which both
spouses must concur in a transaction; the obvious implication is that
in other transactions, the spouses need not agree, and one alone can
act even with the fact of the other spouse's opposition. Additional
support for this view comes from the fact that under the prior law the
husband could act even if the wife opposed the transaction; the current
revision sought to make the spouses equal, and each now possesses that
right. In other words, simple opposition by the other spouse is not
enough to make the first spouse in bad faith; more subjective ill will
or intent to injure the other spouse is needed.
In any event, the inquiry must focus on the motivation of a spouse
in making the questionable management decisions, and on inferences
from conduct that give an indication of that mental state. Considerations
given weight in prior cases include the value of the property sold in
relation to the value of the community; the time of the transaction in
relation to an expected termination of the community; whether the
spouses were on good terms at the time of the conduct; the consideration
received for the transaction; and whether the transaction was a simu-
lation. 92
In Bagur v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,93 the court deter-
mined in an income tax case that the wife would be entitled to a theft
deduction if her husband squandered community funds. Judge John
Minor Wisdom stated, "We hold, however, that an intent to deprive a
wife permanently of her share of the community income may be inferred
from a husband's wanton appropriation of community assets in pursuit
of his own pleasure or needs." ' Even if the analysis in Bagur depended
on state law, one should conclude that spouses can be guilty of theft
from each other under Article 67 of the Louisiana Criminal Code. If
a taking or misappropriation of the other spouse's interest in community
property is fraudulent or without the consent of the other (when consent
is required) and if there is a specific intent to deprive the other of
property, the requirements of the text are satisfied. The difficulty, though,
is finding a specific intent to deprive the other of property, as opposed
to generalized desires of squandering assets or simply making bad in-
vestments.
The mistake of fact defense applies if one takes what one reasonably
believes is one's property. Less clear is the situation when one takes a
92. Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes. § 5.22 at 190 in
16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
93. 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1979).
94. ld. at 502.
1129
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
thing, or money, which clearly is that of another, but with the belief
that one has a claim of right. The classic case is when one tries to
collect a debt by force. In State v. Randolph,9" Justice Albert Tate
wrote one of his masterful ambiguous opinions" to support reversal of
the armed robbery conviction of a former employee who obtained $96
in wages he claimed were owed him. At that time, robbery required a
theft by the use of force. Reversals of such convictions have been
criticized in failing to deter conduct which can pose harm to others and
in rewarding self-help instead of encouraging civil actions to settle dis-
putes. 97 Since the amendment to the Louisiana robbery articles, so that
they now require only a taking and not a theft, the use of force in
such situations is reached and otherwise deterred. If the taking takes
place without force, however, there would still seem to be room for
arguing that such conduct is not theft, and the claim of right defense
would not be subject to criticism because it allows conduct which poses
a danger to life. Further, when small amounts are in dispute, it is not
realistic to argue that a civil remedy is available. 9
Property owned by the state qualifies as belonging to another. 99 At
least things the state owns in its private capacity. '® And it should include
money that the state acquires in its sovereign capacity [escheat] that
95. 275 So. 2d 174 (La. 1973).
96. Our finding is to some extent based upon the extreme facts of this case,
which show: (a) without contradiction, a bona fide dispute about the payment
of wages in the presence of many witnesses, i.e., no pattern of criminal conduct;
(b) the belated but diligent discovery, after conviction, of witnesses only tran-
siently at the scene, who strongly indicate the defendant's innocence of criminal
conduct or intent (and no real opportunity, until after the trial, to produce
such independent proof, where the defense at the trial was based upon the
testimony of the defendant alone); (c) the actions of the trial court at the
preliminary examination, indicating the apparent weakness of the State's case;
(d) the testimony of the prosecuting witness at the trial substantially increasing
and changing the alleged criminal nature of the defendant's conduct, as compared
with his testimony at the preliminary examination (with the intimations of
prosecutorial overkill); and (e) the lack of a real opportunity, until the new
witnesses were discovered after the conviction, to present evidence from inde-
pendent witnesses which casts great doubt upon the version of the prosecuting
witness, nor the real need to do so until the prosecuting witness produced his
trial version of the incident.
275 So. 2d at 176-77.
97. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 725 (2d Ed. 1986).
98. The Model Penal Code is in accord, see § 223.1 commentary at 157 n.99: "One
who is prepared to use violence to regain what he regards as his own property is, properly
viewed, one who should be subjected to the laws designed to regulate violence and not
to the laws designed to regulate the misappropriation of property of another."
99. La. R.S. 14:2(l) (1986).
100. La. Civ. Code art. 453.
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produces interest that was taken by the custodian of the funds.' 0' On
the other hand, wild animals that the state claims ownership of through
a statute are not owned in a proprietary capacity,' 2 so their taking
from the wilds should not constitute theft. Otherwise, every game vi-
olation in which an animal is killed becomes a theft.
'GRADATION OF PENALTY: VALUE
Article 67 maintains three levels of penalty, two felonies and one
misdemeanor, depending on the value of the thing or things taken.
Initially, ten years imprisonment at hard labor was possible if the thing
was valued at $100 or more; two years if the value was $20 up to $100;
6 months if less than $20. The levels of punishment have remained,
with amendments raising the respective thresholds from $100 to $500
and from $20 to $100. Corresponding fines have been increased, so that
the maximum is now $3,000. Considering the recent inflation, it may
well be an opportune time to raise those thresholds once more.
The 1942 code did not purport to establish rules for determining
the monetary value of things stolen. Early cases did not consider the
question in substantial detail, and the supreme court tended to uphold
most factual determinations of value even with little evidentiary sup-
port.'0 3 Since Jackson v. Virginia,'°4 however, the State must prove the
value beyond a reasonable doubt, subject to appellate review, and the
courts are routinely reviewing value determinations. In the absence of
conflicting testimony about the value of furniture taken in State v.
McCray,101 the victim's testimony that "she had bought it new about
a year earlier at a cost of $1,968 and that it had depreciated only 'a
little' in value" was adequate to support a conviction.' °6 On the other
hand, in State v. Peoples,'07 the court reversed when the State proved
the original purchase price of items two to seven years old but offered
no evidence of current value. Defendant had offered the testimony of
an expert in used office machines who testified the value was less than
$500.
The code does not contain a provision like the federal statute which
provides that value means "face, par, or market value, or cost price,
101. State v. Hagerty, 205 So. 2d 369 (La. 1967).
102. Leger v. La. Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 306 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975).
103. E.g., State v. Tullos, 182 So. 321 (La. 1938); State v. Young, 115 So. 407 (La.
1927).
104. 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
105. 305 So. 2d 433 (La. 1974).
106. Id. at 435.
107. 383 So. 2d 1006 (La. 1980).
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either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater.""0 8 This leaves the value
question an open one that is basically a fact issue. An amendment to
Article 2(2) in 1977 did add that in cases of shoplifting, "the actual
retail price of the property at the time of the offense" is the value. A
1978 statute provided that an affidavit of the value of property is
admissible evidence and can be deemed "prima facie evidence of the
value and ownership of the property alleged to be the object of a theft."
But if the defendant objects, the affidavit shall not be admissible and
not be deemed prima facie evidence of the value and ownership.' 9
Still in effect is the aggregation principle-if a defendant has com-
mitted several thefts, the aggregate of the amounts taken governs the
penalty. That aggregation concept has often been used to enhance pun-
ishment for several small takings."10 However, aggregation is not man-
datory. The courts have construed the district attorney's powers under
Article 4 to include deciding whether or not to aggregate the values. In
some instances, as in State v. Joles,"' the non-aggregated penalty can
be more severe. In Joles, the supreme court concluded
that when a person has been accused of committing a series of
distinct thefts which are properly joinable in a single bill of
information, the person may either be charged with one offense
and sentenced upon conviction within the sentencing range for
the grade of the offense determined by the aggregate amount
of all of the thefts or may be charged with each separate offense
and sentenced upon conviction within the sentencing range for
the grade of each particular offense determined by the amount
of the theft." 2
Under that view, for example, twenty $500 thefts could be aggregated
into one $10,000 theft punishable by ten years imprisonment or pros-
ecuted separately with 200 years imprisonment. Justice Harry Lemmon
apparently acknowledges the danger in vesting so much discretion in a
prosecutor. He suggests, however, that there would be control over the
prosecutor's discretion in such a case; "the sentencing discretion vested
in the trial judge, subject to appellate review for excessiveness, provides
an adequate safeguard against an abuse of that charging discretion."" 3
108. 18 U.S.C. 641 (emphasis added). The Model Penal Code in Section 223.1(2)(c)
adopts a similar, but less precise rule, "The amount involved in a theft shall be deemed
to be the highest value, by any reasonable standard, of the property . Model Penal
Code & Commentaries, § 223.1(2)(c) and ccommentary at 140 (1980).
109. 1978 La. Acts No. 243, adding La. R.S. 15:436.1.
110. E.g., State v. Johnson, 453 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
Ill. 492 So. 2d 490 (La. 1986) (Calogero & Watson dissenting; Dennis concurring).
112. Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 495.
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In Joles, a defendant accused of stealing $115,000 in public funds was
sentenced to a total of fifteen years imprisonment." 4
In any event, the simple gradation of punishment suggested in Article
67 has grown into a much broader and complex matter, one with
penalties going much beyond ten years imprisonment. That ongoing
process, described in more detail below, is of long standing, but it may
be curtailed somewhat by the recently adopted sentencing guidelines and
the attempt therein to standardize sentencing."'
The legislature itself departed several times from the basic pattern
of gradation of theft according to value. As early as 1950,1'6 Article
67.1 was added to cover theft of some livestock (cattle, horses, mules,
sheep, hogs, or goats), conduct which would otherwise fit under Article
67. The frontier myth about hanging horse thieves was still abroad, and
the penalty for this special theft was made more severe-not less than
three years nor more than five years imprisonment at hard labor, without
regard to the value of the livestock taken. In 1956, the maximum penalty
was increased to ten years, but the minimum was also removed." 7 Later
amendments added more animals to the list to the point that the list
seems overly inclusive, extending now to "any animal, hybrid, mixture,
or mutation of the species of horses, mules, donkeys, asses, cattle,
swine, sheep, goats, domesticated deer, buffalo, bison, beefalo, or oxen."
Even with this separate offense for theft of livestock, the prosecutor
still has the option, under the provisions of Article 4, to prosecute
under the special statute or the general theft provisions under Article
67. He can proceed with penalties either according to value or according
to the category of things taken."" Conduct under Article 67 may also
114. In a similar vein, the supreme court did not definitively decide whether each
homosexual act during a short time constituted a separate crime. Concurring in State v.
Cramer, 358 So. 2d 1277 (La. 1978), Justice Tate looked at the total jail time ordered,
by virtue of concurrent sentences, and found that the total did not result in reversible
error. On the other hand, note State v. Lejeune, 489 So. 2d 907, 908 (La. 1986) ("The
defendants may not be punished twice for multiple batteries committed against the same
victim in the same encounter .. ").
115. Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Criminal Procedure, Developments in the Law, 1986-.
1987, 48 La. L. Rev. 257 (1987).
116. 1950 La. Acts No. 173.
117. 1956 La. Acts No. 154.
118. 1981 La. Acts No. 165, § 2, an amendment to La. R.S. 14:67.1 provided, "Nothing
herein shall be construed to limit the discretion of the district attorney to determine how
he shall prosecute pursuant to Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." Dale E.
Bennett, Criminal Law, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-51 Term,
12 La. L. Rev. 125, 128 (1952): "In view of the fact that the special provision provides
the almost Draconic penalty of not less than three years imprisonment, regardless of the
value of the animal stolen, it is entirely conceivable that prosecuting authorities may
frequently choose to prosecute less serious cases of livestock stealing under the general
theft article." See also, Louisiana Legislation of 1950, Student Symposium, 11 La. L.
Rev. 22, 41 (1950); State v. Fruge, 204 So. 2d 287 (La. 1967).
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meet the requirements of forgery, dual office holding, improper credit
card use, and several other crimes. In those instances, the prosecutor
gains additional discretion in choosing the range of sentences, one which
is often defended as a valuable incentive in plea bargaining negotiations.
Cats presumably are covered under Article 67, but if a dog is taken,
prosecution may be under Article 67.2, another added special theft statute
whose elements are already covered by Article 67, but with a special
penalty. No minimum imprisonment is specified, but if imprisonment
is in the sentence, it has to be for not less than three months nor more
than six months. Of course, if it is a dog worth more than $500,
punishment can be under Article 67 for up to ten years. Again, the
rationality of the scheme is difficult to fathom. Even under Article 67.2,
if there are multiple offenses of dog theft, a mandatory imprisonment
penalty is included-thirty to sixty days for each additional dog.
MORE DECIMALIZATION ' 9
Articles 67.4 and 67.5, defining theft of domesticated fish and
crawfish from private ponds, added in 197020 and 1977121 are unnecessary
in that those seafood items are anything of value, and if they are in
a private pond, they belong to another. The new provisions also borrow
the value based penalties of Article 67. A possible additional impact
might have been that both statutes make it a crime not only to take
the seafood, but also to fish in a crawfish farm or private pond or
farm. However, since the penalty depends on the value of the fish or
crawfish taken, if one fishes and nothing is caught, there is no penalty
and thus no crime.1 2
Acts 1982, No. 762 added three special thefts related to oilfield
equipment that were already covered by Article 67: Article 67.7-theft
of petroleum products; Article 67.8-theft of oilfield geological survey,
seismograph and production maps; and, Article 67.9-theft of oil and
gas equipment. The impact of these additions is in the sentencing pro-
visions, allowing harsher penalties even if items of small value are taken.
Article 67.12 is a misplaced addition establishing no crime, but directing
a bureaucratic agency to assist in collecting information about theft of
timber.
119. Since the criminal code's original numbering scheme was a straight chronological
one, additions are given decimal numbers; hence the semi-pejorative reference to the
decimalization of the code. Perhaps one could posit a new maxim of construction: whole
number integer articles must be preferred to decimal articles.
120. 1970 La. Acts No. 453.
121. 1977 La. Acts No. 349.
122. Nulla poena sine lege. See Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 27
(1960).
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Although use of credit cards to obtain anything of value without
consent or by fraud would be theft or attempted theft, Article 67.3 was
added, with complicated and unnecessary detail more appropriate for a
common law jurisdiction than Louisiana, to cover that conduct. Here,
no special penalties were adopted, and the penalties of Article 67 were
incorporated by reference. Article 67.11 was added to cover other credit
card activity thought to be harmful, with heavier penalties than Article
67, although most of the conduct there would also be covered by Article
67. Article 67.6, theft of utility service, was an unnecessary addition,
and its attempts at making presumptions of the mental element caused
constitutional problems and prompted later amendments.'
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOVABLE
The primary element of theft not included in Article 68 is the
requirement of an intent to deprive permanently. 24 Typically, the au-
tomobile joy rider is given as an example of the application of the
statute, since he plans to use the vehicle for a short time and then leave
it where it can be found by the owner. 2 ' The text, of course, is broader
and it includes any movable item, even though, as the text states, it
could be an immovable according to civil laws. Interestingly, however,
the text does not use the broad term "anything of value" but the
possibly narrower term "movable." The Model Penal Code took an
even narrower approach, limiting the similar offense to one who "op-
erates" (rather than uses)'2 an "automobile, airplane, motorcycle, mo-
torboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle without the consent of the
owner."1
27
123. See State v. McCoy, 395 So. 2d 319 (La. 1980); 1981 La. Acts No. 108; 1986
La. Acts Nos. 261 & 620; 1987 La. Acts No. 251.
124. Comment to La. R.S. 14:68: "The lack of an intention to deprive the owner of
the movable permanently is the factor which distinguishes this offense from theft. A
verdict of guilty of this offense should be responsive to an indictment for theft."
125. La. R.S. 14:68 replaced statutes that covered using automobiles of another and
animals of another. See the comment to La. R.S. 14:68.
126. "To penalize a non-operational 'use' of a vehicle without the owner's consent,
however, would extend the section beyond its rationale. A man who climbs into a parked
truck in order to conceal himself from the weather or to sleep is not using the vehicle
in any way that involves the dangers of 'joyriding."' Model Penal Code & Commentaries,
§ 223.9 commentary at 273 (1980).
127. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.9. Id. commentary at 271-72, indirectly
criticizing the Louisiana broad approach: "Under such a law, a girl would be a criminal
if she wore her roommate's dress to a party without the roommate's consent. This extension
of criminal liability is rejected because it goes beyond prevailing moral notions and cannot




Article 68 contains the negative statement that the offense occurs
"without any intention to deprive the other of the movable perma-
nently." It also states that there must be "the intentional taking or use
of a movable which belongs to another, either without the other's
consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representa-
tions." Presumably, the modifier "intentional" carries over to the re-
maining elements of the offense so that a reasonable belief that one
had another's consent, even if that were not in fact true, would preclude
guilt of the offense. Such mistakes of fact preclude guilt for theft, as
discussed earlier. The rationale of those decisions is even stronger when
applied to Article 68, where the use of the term "intentional" emphasizes
the mental state whereas the corresponding first sentence of Article 67
omits the use of "intentional."' 128
The supreme court in State v. Bias'2 9 also concluded that Article
68 "must reasonably be construed to require the existence of fraudulent
intent."' 30 If the statute were construed otherwise, every breach of a
rental contract would be included within the reach of the statute, and
the Legislature certainly did not intend such a result. In Bias, defendant
was convicted of Unauthorized Use of Movables on the theory that he
violated a TV rental agreement which required him to notify the owner
of changes of address in addition to making monthly payments. De-
fendant missed several payments and was discovered at a new address.
In that factual setting, the court refused to conclude that defendant was
using the TV sets without consent or by fraudulent practices without
further evidence of his mental state. It is of course possible that even
though the initial taking of the set was with consent and without fraud,
through a continuing use with knowledge that the owner did not consent
or by some later fraudulent representations a defendant could be guilty. 3 '
But simple misuse without a fraudulent animus would not be enough. 3 2
128. Accord: Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223.9, which also goes further
and states it is a defense if one "reasonably believed that the owner would have consented
to the operation had he known of it."
129. 400 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981).
130. Id. at 652. Citing dictum in State v. Kelley, 128 So. 2d 18 (La. 1961).
131. See John S. Baker, Jr., Criminal Law, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982, 43
La. L. Rev. 361 (1982).
132. The Model Penal Code restated and defined the contours of fraud and false
pretenses in its definition of deception. Section 223.3 states one deceives if he purposely:
(i) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value,
intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person's intention to perform a
promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform
the promise; or (2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his
judgment of a transaction; or (3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver
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State v. Carmon'" found a defendant guilty of attempted Unau-
thorized Use of Movables' 1 based on his taking a "long" test drive of
a car offered for sale at a car dealership. "He basically argues that
since Whitaker did not say that he could not keep the car overnight,
it was implied that he could keep the car overnight .... We find this
argument unpersuasive."'" On the other hand, in State ex rel O.B. and
W. L.,111 the fact that two juveniles were riding in a stolen car after
being given a ride by the driver was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
"O.B. testified that he had no idea the car was stolen when he accepted
the ride. He said he saw a set of keys in the ignition and could not
see the broken steering column ... had no reason to doubt him when
the adult driver told him the car belonged to his cousin."'' The court
of appeal for the fourth circuit reversed the adjudication of delinquency.
MOVABLES?
Article 68 does not use the broad term "anything of value" but
the possibly narrower term "movable." That textual anomaly would
support a narrower application of Article 68. On the other hand, a
comment suggests that the distinguishing difference between theft and
Unauthorized Use of Movables is the mental state; another suggests that
immovables are excluded since unauthorized use of land or structures
would instead be trespass.138 These references could be construed to
support a second view that the objects are the same in both offenses
except when the conduct is a trespass. The supreme court's alternative
holding in State v. Gisclair39 leans toward the former view. Chief Justice
Dixon argued "there can be no foundation" for the trial judge equating
movables in Article 68 with anything of value in Article 67. He states
previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another
to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship; or (4) fails to disclose a
known lien, adverse claim or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of property which
he transfers or encumbers in consideration for the property obtained, whether such
impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of official record." It also provides,
"The term 'deceive' does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary
significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group
addressed."
133. 539 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
134. Because of the attempt conviction, the jury had to believe the defendant had the
specific intent to commit the crime. See La. R.S. 14:27.
135. 539 So. 2d at 753.
136. 559 So. 2d 31 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 33. The Model Penal Code is in accord, Model Penal Code & Commentaries,
§ 223.8 commentary at 273 (1980).
138. The Model Penal Code is in accord, Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 223
introductory note at 123, also § 223.2 and commentary at 172 (1980).
139. 382 So. 2d 914 (La. 1980).
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it was meant to cover "tangible objects" since the prior statutes that
were being continued dealt with such objects. Services of employees
were not, in his view, such tangible objects.
PUNISHMENT
Unauthorized Use of Movables in the 1942 code was a minor mis-
demeanor, with punishment set at no more than a $100 fine and no
more than 6 months imprisonment. As amended in 1980 and 1981,140
it can be a serious felony. If the thing used is worth $1,000 or less,
the offense is a misdemeanor-with a fine up to $500 or imprisonment
for no more than six months or both. If the thing used has a value
of $1,000 or more, the offense is a felony with a fine up to $5,000 or
imprisonment at hard labor for three years or both. Oddly, the pun-
ishment is not based on the value of the use of the thing. It is based
on the value of the thing used. Hardly will one ever find a car worth
less than $1,000, so the stereotypical joy riding offense becomes a serious
felony. Even more questionable, composing a letter on a computer worth
more than $1,000 becomes a felony. Some would argue the felony penalty
was necessary because some states refuse to extradite defendants accused
of misdemeanors, including persons who drive automobiles to other
states and leave them there. Perhaps so, but such conduct would be
better addressed by a separate offense for expensive automobiles and
heavy equipment, rather than making the penalty so serious for some
minor infractions.
IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
In lieu of a traditional summary, this article concludes its discussion
of Articles 67 and 68 of the Louisiana Criminal Code with the text of
those articles as originally adopted in 1942, with minor suggested
changes.' 1 A return to those basics along with repeal of the decimal
statutory encrustations would perhaps be the best way of honoring the
durability and desirability of the basic code provisions:
Article 67. Theft is the intentional misappropriation or taking
of anything of value which belongs to another, either without
the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or
by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or representations.
Theft also is the failure of a person who comes into control of
anything of value knowing that it has been lost, mislaid, or
delivered under a mistake to take reasonable measures to restore
the property to a person entitled to have it. An intent to deprive
140. 1980 La. Acts Nos. 692 & 708; 1981 La. Acts No. 293.
141. The suggested changes are indicated by italics.
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the other permanently of whatever may be subject of the mis-
appropriation or taking is essential.
[Penalty unchanged, or perhaps thresholds increased.]
Article 68. Unauthorized Use of Movables is the intentional
taking or use of any corporeal movable which belongs to another,
either without the other's consent, or by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations, but without any intention
to deprive the other of the movable permanently. The fact that
the movable so taken or used may be classified as an immovable,
according to the law pertaining to civil matters, is immaterial.
Whoever commits the crime of unauthorized use of movables
shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned
for not more than six months, or both.
Article 2. "Deprive" means to withhold property of another
permanently or for so extended a time as to appropriate a major
portion of its economic value or with intent to restore only
upon payment of a reward or other compensation or to dispose
of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will
recover it. With respect to services available for hire, it means
to use the service with intent not to pay the fee for use of that
service.
Article 2. "Fraudulent conduct, practices or representations"
means conduct that (1) creates or reinforces a false impression,
including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other
state of mind; but deception as to a person's intention to perform
a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did
not subsequently perform the promise;
or (2) prevents another from acquiring information which
would affect his judgment of a transaction;
or (3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver
previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows
to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or
confidential relationship;
or (4) fails to disclose a known lien, adverse claim or other.
legal impediment to the enjoyment of property which he transfers
or encumbers in consideration for the property obtained, whether
such impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of
official record.
It does not, however, include falsity as to matters having
no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.
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